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Regulatory Quality and Performance in EU Network Industries: 
Evidence on Telecommunications, Gas and Electricity  
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article provides empirical evidence on ex ante and ex post indicators of regulatory quality and the 
relationship between those indicators and market performance in liberalised EU-15 network industries. 
We report a low level of regulatory independence and competence, a high level of cross-country 
variations in regulatory quality, and a prevalent absence of correlation between ex ante regulatory 
quality and ex post performance indicators. On the basis of these findings, we suggest that the design 
of national regulatory agencies (NRAs) in Europe is not optimal and may be conducive to regulatory 
ineffectiveness or outright regulatory failure. Nevertheless, the existence and strengthening of EU-
level regulators could enable EU member states to reduce the risk of regulatory failure by encouraging 
coordination and adoption of best practice.  
 
KEY WORDS: Economics of Regulation, European Public Policy, Regulatory Quality, European 
Network Industries. 
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Introduction  
 
Over the last decade or so, EU network industries have been subject to liberalisation reforms and 
regulation. The timing and extent of liberalisation have differed between sectors and across member 
states; and so has the strength and competence of national regulatory agencies (NRAs). In spite of 
these variations, some students of European regulation point to the emergence of a ‘European order’ of 
network industry regulation, the main characteristics of which are: (i) progressive market opening that 
allows for free entry of suppliers and consumer switching between suppliers; (ii) increasing 
transparency through unbundling of production, transmission and retail supply activities; and (iii) 
establishment of independent NRAs complemented by EU-level regulatory bodies (Napolitano, 2005).  
 
The aim of this article is to assess the quality of the emerging European regulatory regime, which 
consists of the heads or representatives of NRAs and representatives of the EU Commission, in EU-15 
telecommunications, gas, and electricity markets. We begin with a review of the existing literature on 
the political economy of regulation and factors that may reduce the risk of regulatory failure. Then, in 
section 2, we examine the ex ante indicators of regulatory quality in EU network industries. The aim 
here is to provide some evidence on ex ante indicators of regulatory quality and whether there is 
consistency between these indicators. In section 3, we look at some ex post performance indicators 
such as market structure, prices, and consumer switching. The aim here is to ascertain the extent to 
which the NRAs have been effective in influencing supplier behaviour and market structures. Finally, 
the conclusion will bring together the main findings and elaborate on the scope for improving the 
quality of the European regulatory framework.  
 
1.  The political economy of network industry regulation  
 
Network industry regulation is a public policy problem, the resolution of which is complicated by 
information asymmetries, transaction costs, agency problems, and strategic interaction between 
multiple actors such as consumers, suppliers, regulators, and governments. Information asymmetries 
and transaction costs combine to generate incomplete contracts between these actors. Incomplete 
contracts, in turn, may lead to sub-optimal regulatory outcomes that emerge either as inadequate or as 
excessive regulation.  
 
The objective theory of regulation addresses the question as to how transaction costs, information 
asymmetries and principal-agent problems (i.e., the constraints) may lead to regulatory failures. (See, 
Berry, 1982; Estache and Martimort, 1999; Dal Bo, 2006.) Earlier work in this tradition tended to 
focus on regulator’s endowment or membership size of the regulated group as determinants of 
regulatory quality. In the commission inadequacy approach, which dates back to 1930s, inadequate 
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resources and/or expertise tend to prevent the regulator from reducing the excessive rents that the 
regulated firm derives (Frankfurter, 1930; Trachsel, 1950). Students of the group approach, on the 
other hand, argue that the regulator would tend to protect the interest of the regulated industry because 
the large/diffused group of consumers would fail to organise whereas the small group of regulated 
firms would organise effectively and influence regulatory outcomes (Bernstein, 1955; Olson, 1965; 
Wilson, 1974; Berry, 1982).  
 
These pessimistic findings drew further support from studies in which the regulator (equated with the 
government or the legislator) is modelled as a strategic player trying to maximise its own objective 
function (mainly the chance of re-election). For example, Stigler (1971) demonstrates that regulation 
will be excessive and will increase the ability of regulated firms to extract excessive rents through 
restricted competition.  Peltzman (1976) refines Stigler’s model, but arrives at a similar conclusion: 
regulation will typically entail less than optimal protection for consumers, but its protection of 
producer interests will be less pervasive than what the Stigler-type models predict.  
 
This type of modelling acknowledges that regulators have their own objective functions, but it says 
very little about how they realise their objectives. To address this shortcoming, Tirole (1986) and 
Laffont and Tirole (1993) analyse the regulatory process as a two-stage game between the government, 
the regulator, and the regulated firm. In stage one; the firm has private information about its cost, 
which is not yet known to the regulator or government. The government appoints a regulator, whose 
powers are specified via a second-best contract that enables it to increase its knowledge of the firm’s 
true cost structure. The second-best contract reduces but does not eliminate the rents for the firms. In 
stage two, the firm offers the regulator a side-contract (i.e., some kind of bribe) before the latter 
decides how much of the cost information it should pass on to the government. If the regulator takes 
the firm’s offer, the latter continues to extract rents that it now shares with the regulator. If the 
regulator declines, then no rents remain. The problem for the government (i.e., the principal) is then to 
offer the regulator a contract that will induce him not to lie about the firm’s cost structure and to offer 
the firm a regulatory regime that will provide the latter with rents that are just enough to prevent it 
from colluding with the regulator (Dal Bo, 2006: 207).  
The difficulty in resolving this regulatory problem is confirmed in a large number of empirical studies 
on network industries. For example, Upadhyaya and Raymond (1994), who use cross-sectional US 
data for 1922, 1927 and 1932, report that the US regulatory regime was unsuccessful in lowering state-
level electricity prices below monopoly levels. There are similar findings from time-series US data too. 
For example, Upadhyaya and Mixon (1995) use national US time-series data for 1918-53 and report 
that regulation was not a statistically significant determinant of prices in that period. Finally, Mitra et 
al (2005) also report that the Energy Policy Act of 1992 and the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission Orders of 1996 did not lead to production or cost efficiency in the US electricity market 
between 1983-1999. 
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Despite these pessimistic findings, it is difficult to make a case against regulation of network 
industries, where market power remains a significant issue. Instead, one can make a case to treat 
regulation as a necessary but not sufficient condition for reducing the distortions that arise from 
market power. Identifying the sufficient conditions and providing institutional design solutions are 
issues within the realm of the normative theory of regulation, which examines the institutional 
arrangements that may enable the policy maker to reduce the risk of regulatory failure. For this 
purpose, Estache and Martimort (1999) provide an extensive list of contractual design characteristics 
that could minimise the risk of sub-optimal regulation. These are summarized in Table 1 and include 
the following: (i) independence and autonomy of the regulator vis-à-vis the regulated industry and the 
political principal; (ii) multiple regulators with complementary competences; (iii) accountability of the 
regulator; (iv) quality and availability of information about regulatory outcomes; (v) availability of 
industry-specific information to be shared between regulators; and (vi) anti-collusion measures 
applicable to current and future relations between the regulator and the regulated industry.  
 
(Insert Table 1 here). 
 
One contractual/institutional design characteristic that may reduce the risk of regulatory failure is 
independence. Independent regulators are more likely to deliver efficient ex post outcomes because 
they can help resolving the conflict between credible commitments and ex post efficiency. Given that 
any regulatory contract is essentially incomplete due to information asymmetries and agency problems, 
it would be more efficient to allow for re-negotiations of the regulatory contract. If periodic changes in 
the regulatory contract are undertaken by the government who also control the regulator, it will be less 
feasible to distinguish between changes introduced for political convenience and those introduced with 
a view to improve the regulatory contract on the basis of new and relevant information. Once this 
confusion arises, the regulated industry will question the credibility of the regulatory standards and 
will increase its lobbying activities aimed at inducing the government to change the regulatory 
requirements.  
 
However, if the regulator is independent the regulated industry will have less incentive to lobby the 
government for change. This is because the rates of return on lobbying will fall either because the 
independent regulator is likely to resist government pressure or the government will be able to deflect 
the lobby pressure on the ground that the independent regulator has different information that 
contradicts the private information of the firm. The end result will be that the regulatory contract will 
remain credible between reviews and the latter will incrementally improve the quality of the contract 
over time. This combination will increase the probability of securing optimal ex post outcomes in 
terms of efficiency and welfare.  
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Another contractual design characteristic that increases the probability of optimal ex post outcomes is 
the existence of multiple regulators with complementary competences. This characteristic may 
minimise the risk of regulatory failure for two reasons. First, complementarity - i.e., absence of 
overlapping competences – minimises the scope for regulated firms to ‘shop’ between regulatory 
jurisdictions with a view to choose the most lenient regulator. Secondly, regulators with 
complementary powers set the level of regulation in their area of competence without having to take 
into account the standards set by other regulators. In other words, the regulators are not motivated to 
dilute their regulatory toughness with a view to secure the loyalty of the regulated firms. (See Laffont 
and Martimort, 1999).  
 
 
2.  Ex ante indicators of regulatory quality in EU network industries 
 
The institutional/contractual design characteristics discussed above should be considered as relevant 
only for assessment of ex ante regulatory quality – and not as determinants of ex post regulatory 
outcomes with respect to prices or investment or service quality. However, it is possible to establish a 
theoretical link between the ex ante indicators of regulatory quality and ex post outcomes, and to 
empirically test if the existing evidence supports or refutes the theorised link. Therefore, in what 
follows, we first assess the ex ante indicators of regulatory quality in EU-15 network industries and 
then we examine the extent to which these quality indicators have had the expected effects on ex post 
performance in regulated markets. This is necessary not only to avoid hasty generalisations about the 
quality of regulatory outcomes but also to increase the tractability of the findings.  
 
 
2.1 Co-existence of EU and national regulatory bodies 
 
One ex ante characteristic of the emerging European regulatory regime is the co-existence of both 
national regulatory authorities (NRAs) and EU-level regulatory bodies such as ERG (The European 
Regulators Group for Electronic Communications) and ERGEG (The European Regulators Group for 
Electricity and Gas). This co-existence tends to satisfy the condition of complementary in two ways. 
First, it could legitimise the incorporation of any EU-level rules or agreements into national regulatory 
policies. As a result of the potential convergence that would follow, firms would find it more difficult 
to engage in regulatory arbitrage by moving between jurisdictions. Secondly, the newly established 
EU regulatory bodies such as ERG or ERGEG derive their legitimacy from the high level of 
professional expertise concentrated in critical areas of the national regulatory domains and in cross-
border issues that arise from the nature of the emerging single European market for network industries. 
Finally, EU-level regulatory bodies are formally incorporated into the supranational rule development 
and enforcement of the Commission. Indeed, the Commission refers frequently to the reports and 
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recommendations of ERG and ERGEG in its proposals for new directives or regulations aimed at 
increasing competition and strengthening the regulatory framework in network industries (Eberlein 
and Newman, 2008). 
 
Writing on EU-level regulatory bodies that precede the network industry regulators such as ERG and 
ERGEG,  Majone (2000, 2002) reports that EU-level regulatory bodies tended to act as central nodes 
that encourage efficient cooperation, coordination and adoption of best practice among national and 
sub-national regulatory agencies. Majone (2002) indicates that the effectiveness of these ‘first-
generation’ European regulators depended on three conditions: (i) high levels of mutual trust and 
cooperation between agencies; (ii) high levels of professionalism; and (iii) a common regulatory 
philosophy. Yet, there is no agreement on whether the first-generation European regulators have been 
designed in a way that satisfies these conditions. For example, Coen and Doyle (2000) indicate that 
EU-level legislation provides only for a regulatory framework, leaving detailed legislation to be 
adopted at the national level.  In addition, European liberalisation and regulatory reforms tend to result 
from sub-optimal compromises determined by bargaining between member states, between the latter 
and the commission, and between the member states and regulated industries. (See, Heritier, 2001). In 
other words, the positive effect of EU-level regulatory bodies on the quality of national regulation 
cannot be taken for granted. Although the they may reduce the risk a ‘drive to the bottom’ in terms of 
regulatory toughness, they may not necessarily lead to diffusion of best practice due to factors related 
to the process of EU policy making - e.g., bargaining, multiplicity of political actors, issue linkage, etc.  
 
Recent work on the second generation of EU-level regulatory bodies including ERGEG provides 
similar findings. For example, Eberlein and Newman (2008: 36) identify factors similar to those 
identified by Majone (2002) and argue that ‘professional homogeneity’, the degree of ‘delegated 
authority’ and ‘administrative capacity’ are the determinants of the differences in the ability of 
national and EU-level regulators to perform effective regulation. Their findings on ERGEG suggest 
that the latter has made key contributions to the development of the internal energy market. One such 
contribution was the codification of its policy proposals into the European Commission’s third 
legislative package of 2006 for further liberalisation and regulation of the electricity and gas markets. 
Secondly, ERGEG’s opinions and recommendations have been referred to as blueprints for best 
practice by the Council and the Parliament. Yet, ‘lack of full independence from government and 
insufficient powers’ limit the effectiveness of national enforcement by NRAs, leading to ‘regulatory 
asymmetry between national jurisdictions’ (Eberlein and Newman, 2008: 44). 
 
On the basis of these findings and my reading of ERG and ERGEG achievements after 2004, it is 
possible to argue that the emerging EU-level regulators of network industries are a step in the right 
direction. This is mainly because they have been effective in limiting the scope for downward 
convergence in EU regulatory standards. Stated differently, ERG and ERGEG have been instrumental 
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in preventing a drive to the bottom in terms of regulatory norms and have strengthened the hand of the 
European Commission in its bargaining with national governments. However, both ERG and ERGEG 
are still far from being able to ensure upward convergence in EU network industry regulation. In fact, 
they are due to be superseded by new EU-level regulatory agencies – as envisaged in the third reform 
package of the European Commission for electricity and gas, and in the fifth reform package for 
electronic communications. The third package for electricity and gas was approved by the European 
Parliament in September 2007 and is expected to be endorsed by the Council by December 2009. The 
fifth package concerning electronic communications is yet to be debated by the European Parliament 
and the Council. Unlike ERG and ERGEG, the future EU-level regulatory agencies will be funded 
through the EU budget and will be empowered to take binding decisions. However, their competence 
is likely to remain limited to cross-border issues, excluding other areas of regulation concerning prices, 
investment, and intra-country concentration.   
 
2.2 Regulatory competence and independence  
 
Two other ex ante regulatory quality indicators are independence and competence. Regulatory 
independence is necessary to resolve the government’s commitment problem and address problem of 
resource/expertise adequacy. Regulatory competence, on the other hand, is necessary to ensure that 
relevant market outcomes such as prices, environmental standards, investment or universal service are 
within the regulator’s competence. Table 2 below provides evidence on indicators of regulatory 
independence and regulatory competence in 15 EU member states. The data, obtained from 
Copenhagen Economics, is derived from a detailed examination of the national regulatory legislation 
on national regulators and the resources made available to them. It had been used in the reports 
commissioned by the Internal Market Directorate-General of the European Commission (Copenhagen 
Economics, 2005).  
 
The regulatory independence indicator is constructed by taking the simple average of the scores for a 
number of sub-indicators, which consist of: budgetary allowance, number of personnel weighted by 
population, and whether the regulator share power with other governmental bodies. Each sub-indicator 
is assigned a value between 0 and 1, depending on the level of independence, relative 
budget/personnel size, and the extent of power sharing. Similarly, the regulatory competence indicator 
is also the average of the sub-indicators measuring the regulator’s competence with respect to 
regulation of prices for different types of consumers and network users, conditions of access to the 
network, and quality of service. For both indicators, a value close to 0 indicates highly limited 
independence or competence whereas a value close to 1 indicates high levels.  
 
The evidence in Table 2 paints a mixed picture about regulatory competence and independence in the 
three industries. First, existing NRAs in general do not enjoy a high degree of independence, the cross-
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section average of which is 0.55 for telecommunications, followed by 0.54 for gas and 0.49 for 
electricity. This implies that NRAs, on average, enjoy only about half of the level of independence that 
a fully-fledged regulator is expected to enjoy. Therefore, NRAs face a risk of regulatory capture, as 
predicted by ‘commission inadequacy’ theory of regulation. 
 
(Insert Table 2 here). 
 
Secondly, the evidence suggests that there is a high degree of variation between NRA independence 
across member states. The coefficient of variation is highest for the gas industry regulators (at 43.61%) 
followed by electricity regulators (at 41.72%). In the telecommunications industry, there is a higher 
degree of convergence as reflected by the low value for the coefficient of variation at 16.64%. The 
implication here is that further coordination is needed to encourage the adoption of best practice with 
respect to regulatory independence in gas and electricity industries. 
 
The third observation relates to the scope of regulatory competence. On average, NRAs tend to have 
competence in only about one-third to 50% of the full range of competence areas. The level of 
regulatory competence is highest in the telecommunications industry (at 0.57) and lowest in the gas 
industry (at 0.32.). In addition, the extent of variation between regulatory competences of the NRAs is 
highest in the gas industry (at 65.99%) and lowest in the electricity and telecommunications industries 
(at 23.24% and 22.43%, respectively). The implication here is that member states with low regulatory 
competence are likely to have a dampening effect on the development of regulatory competence in the 
rest of the EU due to the artificial competitive edge that low regulatory competence provides.  
 
What is also significant is the extent of correlation between the levels of regulatory independence and 
competence across EU-15 countries. A high level of correlation between the two ex ante indicators 
would suggest that NRAs, across EU-15, are equipped with the resources that are commensurate with 
the range of regulatory competences they have. A low level of correlation, on the other hand, would 
indicate that the level of resources is either too high or too low compared to the range of regulatory 
competences. We have calculated the Pearson’s rank correlation coefficient for the two indicators in 
2003 – the latest year for which data is available. The results indicate that the estimated coefficients 
are very low (0.118 and 0.139 for electricity and gas regulators, respectively) and not statistically 
significant at 5%. In telecommunications, the correlation coefficient is 0.587 and it is statistically 
significant. Even though this correlation is not strong, it distinguishes the telecommunications 
regulators from gas and electricity regulators where there is evident mismatch between independence 
and regulatory competence across EU-15. There are two types of anomalies that cause mismatch 
between regulatory competence and independence or vice versa.  
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The first type of anomaly concerns high levels of independence combined with low levels of 
competence. This is evident in the case of electricity regulators in Austria and the UK, with significant 
levels of independence (0.64 and 0.74, respectively) but relatively limited competence (0.26 and 0.57, 
respectively). In the gas industry, Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Sweden 
display similar anomalies. In the case of telecommunications, Finland falls into the same category. 
These discrepancies suggest that NRAs in these countries/industries tend to have high levels of 
independence, but this independence is not deployed across a wide range of regulatory competences. 
The implication here is that regulators in these countries/industries may be effective in regulating a 
limited number of market outcomes, but this effectiveness is obtained at a cost of weak or ineffective 
regulation with respect to other outcomes. 
 
The second type of anomaly is the mirror image of the first: low independence coupled with high 
levels of regulatory competence. The French and Spanish regulators in the electricity industry, the 
Spanish regulator in the gas industry, and the French and the Dutch regulators in the 
telecommunications industry fall into this category. The implication for regulatory quality here is that 
these regulators are either not independent of the government or they spread their powers too thinly 
over a large number of regulatory targets. In any case, their regulatory decisions are likely to be open 
to the risk of capture either by the industry or by the government. 
 
2.3 Transparency 
 
The third ex ante indicator relates to transparency requirements that regulated firms must comply with 
in their pricing strategies and access provision. Transparency is necessary for enabling end-users or 
other users to choose between different retail suppliers or network operators. It is also necessary to 
monitor the performance of the regulator in terms of its effect on firm behaviour. In this section, we 
examine only the first type of transparency as the second type can be measured only ex post.  Data 
availability limits the exercise to the electricity and gas industries, the transparency indicators of 
which are provided in Table 4 below. 
 
The index in Table 3 is derived from NRA responses to a questionnaire sent by ERGEG. It is 
constructed as follows: for each transparency criterion specified by ERGEG, we assign a value of 1 if 
the response from the NRA confirms transparency; a value between 0.25 - 0.75 if the answer is 
qualified; and a value of 0 if the answer confirms no transparency. The transparency index in the last 
column is the national average across the transparency criteria; whereas the index in the last row of 
the table is the EU average across member states for each transparency criteria. The transparency 
criteria (C1-C7) are described in the note under the table.  
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(Insert Table 3 here). 
 
The table shows that no member state satisfies the condition of full transparency with respect to all 
criteria. Similarly, no single criterion is satisfied by all member states. In addition, ERGEG (2005) 
explicitly states that NRAs did not provide detailed information about how transparency is ensured 
when they report that this is the case. In other words, the index is actually too generous a measure of 
transparency. Despite this, the overall level of transparency is 0.56 - with large range of overall 
variation from 0.11 to 0.89 between countries. The range of overall variation is smaller (from 0.42 to 
0.77) between transparency criteria, but this should be considered in the light of two additional 
observations. First, the lowest level of transparency (0.42) is observed in C7, which measures the 
comparability of published prices. This implies that EU-15 gas and electricity companies, as of 2005, 
introduced and maintained a high level of noise into their price information, and the national 
regulators were least effective in this area. Secondly, the highest transparency score is observed in C1 
– publication of price lists. This suggests that regulators have been successful in forcing the regulated 
gas and electricity companies to publish price information, but this information does not lend itself to 
effective price comparison. 
 
According to ERGEG (2005: 5), lack of transparency benefits incumbents, undermines the position of 
new entrants, and aggravates consumer mistrust in the price formation mechanism. That is why EU 
Commission (2007: 8) reports that all network users demand more transparency and that there is little 
harmonisation between member-state transparency requirements. These official evaluations confirm 
the low levels of the transparency index we present in Table 3 and enable us to conclude that NRAs 
regulating the electricity and gas industries do not yet satisfy the transparency condition for effective 
regulation.  
 
The evidence presented so far is by no means exhaustive, however it provides some useful insights 
into the extent to which the emerging regulatory regime in EU-15 satisfies the ex ante conditions for 
minimising the risk of regulatory failure. On the one hand, the emerging regulatory regime is in line 
with the normative implications of the economic theory of regulation as it combines national and EU-
level regulatory frameworks. This design reduces the risk of excessively lenient regulation, but it is 
compromised by extensive bargaining and compromises that characterise the EU decision-making 
process. On the other hand, the emerging regime combines both strong and weak national regulators in 
terms of regulatory competence and independence. This mixture may be interpreted as a reflection of 
transition towards more convergence across member states. However, and until such convergence 
occurs by moving towards higher standards, the existing arrangements are essentially sub-optimal. 
This is due to relatively low levels of regulatory competence and independence as well as to mismatch 
between the two.   
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3.  Ex post indicators of regulatory quality and outcomes  
 
In this section, we examine evidence on market outcomes that can be associated with the effectiveness 
of regulation in EU network industries. We begin with the market opening index (MOI), which 
measures the extent of liberalisation in the relevant industry as of 2003. The MOI is calculated as an 
index between 0 (not open) and 1 (fully open) on the basis of legal and actual arrangements in place 
with respect to: (i) unbundling of transmission and distribution system operators; (ii) third-party access 
to distribution, transmission and storage infrastructure; and (iii) the degree of free choice of supplier. 
The data for MOI is obtained from Copenhagen Economics Market Opening Milestones database. 
Descriptive statistics for the MOI over the 1990-2003 period are as follows: in the gas sector, the EU-
15 average of the MOI was 0.14 and the coefficient of variation was 134%; in the electricity and 
telecommunications sectors, respectively, the corresponding figures were 0.25 and 0.25 for the MOI 
average, and 84% and 97% for the coefficient of variation. As of 2003, the EU-15 average of MOI 
was 0.54 for gas, 0.67 for electricity, and 0.72 for telecommunications; with corresponding 
coefficients of variation at 187% for gas, 68% for electricity, and 49% for telecommunications.  
 
 
3.1 Regulatory independence/competence and market opening 
 
In the initial stage of liberalisation, we would expect regulatory competence and independence to 
increase in line with the level of market opening (i.e., liberalisation). This is because liberalisation of 
network industries constitutes a move from a state-owned monopoly towards an oligopolistic or 
monopolistically competitive market that requires effective regulation. Therefore, theoretically, we 
expect a high degree of cross-section correlation between the level of market opening on the one hand 
and the levels of regulatory independence/competence on the other. To verify whether this is the case, 
we use the regulatory independence/competence indicators presented in Table 2 and the market 
opening index (MOI) summarised above. To reflect the significance of the length of time over which 
market opening has reached a certain threshold (0.3), we multiplied the national MOI in 2003 with the 
number of years over which market opening was 0.3 or greater in that member states.  
 
The findings (not tabulated here due to space limitations), suggests that the coefficients of correlation 
between the weighted MOI and regulatory independence/competence are rather low (between - 0.08 
and 0.33 for the MOI/Independence correlation and between 0.11 and 0.60 for the MOI/Competence 
correlation) and statistically not significant – with the exception of the gas industry. In the latter, the 
coefficient is 0.6 and it is statistically significant at 10% level. These findings enable us to argue that 
the cross-country data for 2003 does not indicate a statistically significant correlation between the 
level of liberalisation and regulatory institution building. This could be either because regulatory 
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institution building has been lagging behind the level of liberalisation or vice versa. Irrespective of 
which is the case, it is safe to conclude that there is a high degree of arbitrariness in the way in which 
the European regulatory framework has been taking shape over the last decade. The gas industry is the 
exception that proves the rule: we observe a relatively high (0.60) and statistically significant degree 
of correlation in this industry because both the weighted MOI and the level of regulatory competence 
in this industry are low!  
 
3.2 Regulatory indicators, competition and prices 
 
Over time, effective network industry regulation can be expected to induce a higher level of 
competition, leading to lower prices as a result of reduced concentration and collusive behaviour. 
Formally, the impact of regulation-induced competition on prices can be stated as follows (MacAvoy, 
2007: 9-10):  
 
(PQ - ΣCi Qi ) / PQ = HHI (1 + v) / e.   (Eq. 1) 
Where: 
P = industry price    Q =  industry output Ci = firm i’s variable cost per unit 
Qi = firm i’s outptut   e = demand elasticity  
HHI= Herfindahl-Hirschman index (sum of squares of market shares of firms in the industry, takes values 
between 0 and 1) 
v = conjectural variation index (a measure of collusive/coordinated behaviour, which can be smaller, equal or 
greater than zero).   
 
The left hand side of the equation is the price-cost margin at equilibrium, measured as proportion of 
industry revenue. Assuming that demand elasticity is constant, the right hand side of the equation 
suggests that the price-cost margin will fall if the concentration level (HHI) and extent of collusive 
behaviour (v) falls. Table 4 below provides some evidence on network industry price indices over time 
- with 1997 as the base period. 
  
(Insert Table 4 here). 
 
Table 4 suggests that prices in the telecommunications industry has fallen significantly over time and 
in comparison with the level of inflation (the harmonised index of consumer prices – HICP) in EU15. 
This is in line with the expected effect of regulation. The average price index for electricity reflects a 
less clear-cut trend. It tended to fall until 2002, but started to increase from 2003 onwards. 
Nevertheless, both price indices (households and industrial customers) for electricity have remained 
below the HICP index throughout the period. This is also in line with the expected effect of regulation, 
but the evidence is less clear-cut than the telecommunications sector for 3 reasons. First, the fall in the 
price index has occurred before the introduction of the regulatory reform package at the EU level; (ii) 
the increase in the price index, however, occurred from 2003 onwards when regulatory effectiveness 
was expected to increase as a result of EU-level coordination; and (iii) Equation 1 above indicates that 
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the fall in price levels should be substantive and continuous until the concentration ratio and the level 
of strategic collusion have been reduced to levels compatible with effective competition.  
 
In contrast to electricity and telecommunications, price indices for gas have increased over time and 
relative to the HICP index despite the fact that the market opening reforms in this industry began at the 
same time as electricity. Explanations of the increase in gas prices include the following: (i) indexation 
of gas prices to oil prices; (ii) supply bottlenecks caused by network capacity; (iii) significant market 
power enjoyed by incumbents; and (iv) long durations of sale/purchase contracts. (ERGEG, 2006; EU 
Commission, 2007).  Therefore, excluding the impact of other factors that may affect price levels, we 
can conclude that regulation has been associated with significant decline in telephony prices, had an 
uncertain effect on electricity prices, and failed to dampen the price increases in the gas sector.  
 
Another way in which we can try to establish if association exists between regulation and price levels 
is to look at coefficients of correlation between prices and regulatory quality indicators across member 
states. Table 5 below provides the correlation coefficients for regulatory indicators and retail price 
indices for electricity, gas and telecommunications.  The regulatory indicators are the independence 
and competence indicators presented in Table 2 above. The retail price indices (RPIs) are adjusted by 
taking: (i) the difference between industry price index and the harmonised index of consumer prices 
(HICP); and (ii) the ratio of the industry price index to HICP. For RPI as well as HICP, the base year 
is 1997.  
 
(Insert Table 5 here). 
 
 
The results reported in Table 5 indicate that only two coefficients of correlation are statistically 
significant at 10% level: the coefficients of correlation between regulatory competence in the 
telecommunications industry and the adjusted RPI for national calls. In addition, these coefficients 
have the ‘correct’ (i.e., negative) sign, indicating that an increase in regulatory competence is 
associated with price falls across member states. The remaining 22 coefficients are statistically 
insignificant and 8 of them have incorrect (i.e. positive) signs. Given these results, it is possible to 
conclude that, with the possible exception of national call prices, the levels of regulatory activity in 
2003 were not associated with lower gas, electricity or telephone call prices in 2005.  
 
One reason for these results is that independence and competence of NRAs are distributed unequally 
across EU-15 and they tend to be around only 50-60% of fully effective levels – as indicated in Table 
2 above. In addition, some member states such as the UK, Sweden, and Austria have had independent 
NRAs for gas and electricity since mid-1990s. These regulators have either advisory or concurrent 
powers shared with national competition authorities (EU Commission, 2005b: 22). Some others such 
as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany and the UK have also had well-established NRAs in the 
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telecommunications industry. However, in the rest of the EU-15, NRAs are either not independent of 
the government or do not have advisory or concurrent powers with the national competition authorities. 
In addition, the European Commission has so far had to maintain a lenient approach to competition 
issues in network industries. For example, it has taken only 16 actions against infringement of 
competition rules from 2003-2007. Also, it has prohibited only 2 out of 439 network industry mergers 
and acquisitions that have taken place between 1995-2005 (EU Commission, 2007a: 54). Given the 
absence of conjunction between competition and regulation authorities and the relative weakness of 
the latter, it is not surprising to observe that the association between ex ante regulatory indicators and 
ex post outcomes such as price levels is very weak and statistically insignificant.  
 
Another reason relates to persistent market concentration and the ability of the incumbents to 
manipulate prices. According EU Commission (2005a and 2006), the gas and electricity markets 
remain concentrated and create scope for incumbents to influence prices. In addition, many wholesale 
markets are illiquid either due to long term contracts (gas) or because companies are active both in 
production and in the retail markets (electricity). Finally, the lack of transparency aggravates mistrust 
in the price formation mechanisms in the retail and wholesale markets. These indicators of distortions 
to competition are confirmed by ERGEG (2006), which highlight the tendency to ‘nurture European 
champions’ through cross-border mergers. According to ERGEG these mergers may well lead to 
future market dominance - despite or perhaps because of recent developments towards market 
integration. National regulators ‘are unable to effectively monitor cross-border unbundling.’ Therefore, 
a single company operating in one country may own subsidiaries in another country and operate its 
network with a view to benefit the subsidiaries.   
ERGEG (2006: 7) also indicates that NRA reports for the gas and electricity markets contain 
‘alarming cases where regulators have increasingly had to coordinate decisions with political decision- 
makers’. In other cases, governments have been able to overrule decisions taken by the regulators – 
‘setting returns on capital or giving direct instructions to the board of directors of the regulator.’  
ERGEG had already drawn attention to these problems in its 2005 report, however the situation has 
deteriorated over the year. The main reason is that rising energy prices and tighter capacities have 
been used to justify intervention into a market that is perceived not to deliver secure supply at low 
prices. However, this intervention is carried out not through regulators but through political discretion. 
This is a recipe not only to undermine the authority/credibility of the regulators but also to induce the 
latter to be lenient towards the regulated. 
 
The exception is telecommunications, but even in this industry competition has been constrained due 
to dominant position of the incumbents in fixed telephony and oligopolistic competition in mobile 
telephony. While the number of major players increased in the majority of EU15, it was reduced in 
France and Sweden. Nevertheless, market developments in the telecommunications sector have been 
in the direction of moving away from vertical integration and the average market share of the 
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incumbent in fixed telecommunications has fallen from 100% at the start of liberalisation to 
approximately 65% in 2005 (EU Commission, 2007a). 
 
3.3 Regulation and consumer switching 
The extent of switching between suppliers is a significant indicator of the scope for competition. 
Tables 6 below provide information on this indicator in the electricity and gas markets (gas market 
figures are in parenthesis). Switching data is not available for telecommunications.  
(Insert Table 6 here). 
 
 
In the electricity market, there are 5 member states where about 50% of the large industrial users have 
switched from one supplier to the other since market opening. These are Denmark, Finland, Ireland, 
Sweden and the UK.   In the remaining member states that have reported switching data, the rate for 
large industrial users ranged between about 10 - 35 per cent. Despite the variation, the evidence 
indicates a significant level of switching activity by large users of electricity. However, the rate of 
switching is very low among small commercial and household users – with the exception of the UK 
(50% since market opening), The Netherlands (35%) and Belgium (19%). In fact, in some member 
states switching between suppliers is either not allowed or has been introduced only recently. A 
similar trend is observable in the gas industry too: in only two member states (Italy and the UK) was 
the rate of switching significant (35% to 50%) among large as well as small users.  
 
 
 
4.  Conclusions and policy implications 
 
The theoretical and empirical literature on the quality of regulation tends to report pessimistic findings. 
Regulators, in contrast to declared intentions, tend to remain ineffective in reducing the price-cost 
margins of companies in oligopolistic or monopolistically competitive markets. Although there are 
variations in the findings about the extent of regulatory failure, these variations are about the degree of 
regulatory failure - and not about whether failure does occur.  
 
The evidence analysed above enables us to verify the extent to which the emerging regulatory regime 
in EU network industries has been designed in a manner that would minimise the risk of regulatory 
failure highlighted in work on other cases. On the positive side, we have established that the co-
existence of EU- and national-level legislation and regulatory bodies is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for reducing the risk of regulatory failure. In addition, we have established that there is 
scope for the diffusion of best regulatory practice through the coordination and cooperation activities 
of the EU-level regulatory bodies such as ERG and ERGEG.  
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On the negative side, however, we have identified a large number of ex ante and ex post indicators that 
suggest that the emerging European regulatory regime is less than optimal. The ex ante indicators of 
regulatory independence and competence suggest that NRAs are highly unequal across countries and 
that there is significant discrepancy between regulatory independence and competence in each member 
state. In addition, the level of transparency with respect to price and network access is inadequate in 
the gas and electricity markets, even though we do not have data for the telecommunications market. 
The ex post indicators demonstrate that, with the exception of national calls in the telecommunications 
sector, there is no statistically significant correlation between indictors of regulatory 
independence/competence on the one hand and the level of market opening or prices on the other. This 
lack of correlation suggests that the independence/competence of NRAs is not commensurate with the 
level of market opening at the national level. Therefore, and not surprisingly, the 
independence/competence of NRAs is not a good predictor of the price level or degree of competition 
in member states. Finally, we have also established that a decade of market opening and regulation has 
not led to high levels of switching among small users of electricity and gas – even though non-
availability of data has prevented us from assessing the switching rate in the telecommunications 
industry.  
 
One policy implication that can be derived from the analysis above is that it is necessary to invoke 
competition rules against anti-competitive behaviour by firms and against member states that fail to 
transpose EU regulations and directives into national legislation – especially in the gas and electricity 
markets. There are signs indicating movement in that direction. In its network industries evaluation 
report for 2006, the Commission reports that it has taken 16 actions against member states/firms in the 
gas and electricity sectors (EU Commission, 2007a). This is a small number but it signals to the 
possibility of increased future activism, which may help address the deficiencies of the national 
regulatory regimes. Yet it must be viewed against the background of two adverse tendencies. First, the 
level of national mergers and take-overs (70% of aggregate value and 75% of total numbers) that may 
reduce the contestability of the national markets has been much higher than that of cross-border 
mergers and take-overs (30% and 25%, respectively) that may increase the contestability of national 
markets. Secondly, the rate of prohibiting mergers on competition grounds has been quite low – only 
0.5% between 1995-2005 (EU Commission, 2007a: 51-54). 
 
The other policy implication is related to the first and points to the need to increase the powers of EU-
level regulators such as ERG and ERGEG. Indeed, the Commission has made a move in that direction 
by adopting on 19 September 2007 a third package of legislative proposals, which provides, inter alia, 
for the establishment of a new Agency for the Cooperation of National Energy Regulators (ACER). 
The package was approved by the European Parliament on 19 September 2007 and the Council 
adopted a common position on 9 January 2009, with a view to endorse the package by December 2009. 
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Under the new package, ACER will be funded from the EU budget and will have the power to take 
binding decisions – unlike ERGEG which acts mainly as a platform for voluntary coordination based 
on the principle of ‘comply or explain’. The European Commission also put forward similar proposals 
for telecommunications regulation in November 2007, but these proposals have not yet been discussed 
or approved by the European Parliament or the Council.  Given these developments, it can be 
conjectured that the increase in the competence and independence of the EU-level regulator may 
reduce the risks of regulatory failures examined above. However, in the electricity and gas sectors, it 
will take a long time for the European Commission and the member states to strike a bargain about the 
specific powers of ACER and how much of the NRAs’ powers should be transferred to it. It will take 
an even longer time to observe any change in the telecommunications sector.  
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Table 1: Minimising transaction costs through regulatory design 
 
Sources of transaction costs Adverse effects 
 
To minimise the adverse effects: 
Conflict between 
commitment and ex post 
efficiency: incompleteness of 
the regulatory contract makes 
periodic renegotiations 
necessary and/or efficient. 
Prospect of renegotiations induces 
the firm to under-invest in specific 
assets in period 1 and chooses 
inefficient technology to 
manipulate the regulator’s beliefs 
about its performance in period 2. 
 
• Create independent regulatory 
bodies to improve commitment; 
• Combine commitment rules with 
rules for fine-tuning. 
 
Multiple agency problems in 
government: competition 
between departments and 
bureaucracies for distribution 
of regulatory rights and rents. 
 
Sub-optimal regulation due to 
multiplicity of regulators: 
excessive regulation when 
regulated activities are 
complementary; inadequate 
regulation when activities are 
substitutes. 
 
 
• Optimise the number of 
regulatory bodies with 
complementary competences; 
• Improve information through 
benchmarking; 
• Enable regulators to share 
information; 
• Make regulators accountable to a 
single elected authority. 
 
Politicians tend to maximise 
welfare of median voter 
rather than social welfare. 
 
Politicians design sub-optimal 
regulatory contracts that maximise 
favours from the regulated 
industry. 
 
• Establish regulatory bodies with 
board structure – to resolve 
representation problems; 
• Increase accountability of the 
political principal. 
 
Regulators strike side 
contracts with regulated firms 
with a view to share rents. 
 
With too much discretion and 
autonomy, regulators try to 
maximise regulatory rents; with 
too little discretion and autonomy, 
regulators tend to prefer the status 
quo.  
 
• Increase accountability of the 
regulator; 
• Increase information on the 
regulator’s performance; 
• Introduce collusion-proof 
constraints – e.g. performance 
incentives coupled with banning 
future employment of regulator in 
regulated industries. 
 
Source: Estache and Martimort (1999: 22). 
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Table 2: Indicators of regulatory independence (IND) and competence (COMP) - 2003 
 
 NRAs in Electricity NRAs in Gas NRAs in Telecomms. 
 IND  COMP IND COMP IND COMP 
Austria 0.64 0.26 0.73 0.39 0.54 0.56 
Belgium 0.66 0.61 0.86 0.48 0.61 0.72 
Denmark 0.43 0.38 0.48 0.33 0.72 0.70 
Finland 0.49 0.40 0.67 0.00 0.55 0.35 
France 0.28 0.51 0.46 0.27 0.39 0.43 
Germany 0.04 0.43 0.00 0.22 0.65 0.80 
Greece 0.37 0.38 0.42 0.00 0.57 0.58 
Ireland 0.76 0.62 0.94 0.47 0.57 0.60 
Italy 0.42 0.48 0.40 0.61 0.53 0.63 
Luxemburg 0.48 0.36 0.51 0.29 0.67 0.53 
The N/lands 0.43 0.46 0.40 0.51 0.40 0.53 
Portugal 0.69 0.36 0.54 0.00 0.55 0.45 
Spain 0.25 0.60 0.29 0.45 0.59 0.70 
Sweden 0.61 0.50 0.67 0.14 0.46 0.40 
UK 0.74 0.57 0.69 0.58 0.49 0.56 
EU-15 
Average 0.49 0.46 0.54 0.32 0.55 0.57 
Coefficient of 
variation (%) 41.72 23.24 43.61 65.99 16.64 22.43 
 
Source: Copenhagen Economics, Market Opening Milestones Database. 
Regulatory independence (IND): simple average of scores (between 0 and 1) for budgetary allowance, number 
of personnel weighted by population, and extent of power sharing with governmental bodies 
Regulatory competence (COMP): simple average of scores (between 0 and 1) for regulation of prices for 
different types of consumers and network users, conditions of access to the network, and quality of service 
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Table 3: Price transparency indices derived from NRA responses for gas and electricity - 2005 
        Transparency  
 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 Index Average 
Spain  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.11 
Sweden  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.29 
France  1.00 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.32 
Portugal  0.75 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.32 
Ireland  0.50 0.50 0.25 0.50 0.50 0.75 0.00 0.43 
Italy  1.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Finland  1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.25 1.00 0.50 0.68 
Austria  1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.71 
Greece  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.71 
Netherlands  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.00 0.82 
Belgium  1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.89 
Great Britain  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 1.00 0.89 
EU-12 Average  0.77 0.44 0.54 0.56 0.50 0.67 0.42 0.56 
Source: Derived from NRA answers in ERGEG (2005: 14, 15, 18). 
 
Transparency index:  
1.00 = full transparency;  0.25 to 0.75 = incomplete transparency;   0 = no transparency 
Transparency criteria: 
C1: Publication of list price is required (by default supplier) 
C2: Publication of offer price is required (by new supplier or when moving to a different tariff)  
C3: Does every supplier publish prices or just the incumbent? 
C4: Does supplier provide price information to the regulator or another body? 
C5: When are prices published: before or after the price change? 
C6: How can a customer compare prices: platform for information and who provides it? 
C7: Is comparability of prices ensured?   
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Table 4: Network industry price indices: EU-15 average prices; 1997 = 100 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Telecommunications Price Indices  
1997=100 (Euro per 10 min call) 
   
Local calls price index: EU-15  100.0 107.0 105.4 104.3 105.9 102.0 102.5 100.5 97.1 
National calls price index EU 15 100.0 82.8 69.0 53.8 40.7 36.9 35.7 31.1 29.2 
Electricity prices indices  
1997=100 (Euro per kWh)  
      
Electricity household price index 100.0 99.0 97.1 95.9 96.9 98.0 101.3 102.9 105.1 
Electricity industrial price index 100.0 98.0 95.2 94.2 94.5 94.9 102.1 98.5 105.5 
Gas prices indices 
1997=100 (Euro per Gigajoule) 
      
Gas household price index 100.0 101.4 95.0 102.9 127.9 121.7 123.4 121.1 133.8 
Gas industrial price index 100.0 96.3 82.1 103.3 152.2 134.6 137.8 133.7 152.3 
HICP,  EU 15, 1997=100 100.0 101.3 102.5 104.4 106.7 109.0 111.1 113.3 115.7 
 
Source: Eurostat (2). 
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Table 5: Correlation matrix for regulatory indicators in 2003 and relative price index (RPI) in 
2005 
 
RPI 
 
Reg. Indicator 
Electricity: 
industrial 
users RPI 
Electricity: 
households 
RPI 
Gas: 
industrial 
users RPI 
Gas: 
households 
RPI 
Telecoms: 
local calls 
RPI 
Telecoms: 
national 
calls RPI 
Independence 
of Electricity 
Regulators  
0.021 
(0.019) 
N = 15 
0.166 
(0.146) 
N = 15 
    
Competence of 
Electricity 
Regulators 
-0.04 
(-0.009) 
N = 15 
-0.147 
(-0.163) 
N = 15 
    
Independence 
of Gas 
Regulators 
  0.075 
(0.080) 
N = 12 
-0.181 
(-0.183) 
N = 13 
  
Competence of 
Gas Regulators 
  -0.154 
(-0.164) 
N = 12 
-0.117 
(-0.139) 
N = 13 
  
Independence 
of Telecoms 
Regulators 
    0.095 
(0.104) 
N = 15 
-0.204 
(-0.196) 
N = 14 
Competence of  
Telecoms 
Regulators 
    -0.003 
(-0.006) 
N = 15 
-0.497* 
(-0.529)* 
N = 14 
* = statistically significant at 10% level. 
RPI = Retail price index, 1997 = 100. 
N = Number of countries for which full data is available 
Top entry: coefficients of correlation when price adjustment is the difference between RPI and HICP in 
2005. 
Bottom entry (in brackets): coefficients of correlation when price adjustment is the ratio of RPI to HICP 
in 2005. 
Source: Eurostat(1) and Copenhagen Economics. 
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Table 6: Switching estimates - Electricity and (Gas) 
 Large industrial users  Small commercial/domestic users 
 
Since market 
opening  
During 
2003 
Since market 
opening  During 2003 
Austria  22% (9%) 7% (9%) 3% (0.5%) 1% (0.5%) 
Belgium  35% (60%) 8% (n.a) 19% (4%) 19% (4%) 
Denmark 50% (30%) 22% (3%) 5% (n.a) 5% (n.a) 
Finland 50% (n.k) 16% (n.k) n.k (n.k) 4% (n.k) 
France  22% (25%) n.k (5%) n.a (n.a) n.a (n.a) 
Germany 35% (7%) n.k (n.k.) 6% (<2%)) n.k (0%) 
Greece 0% (n.k) 0% (n.k) n.a (n.k) n.a (n.k) 
Ireland 50% (>50%) 6% (1%) 1% (n.a) 1% (n.a) 
Italy  c.15% (30%) n.k (n.k) n.a (35%) n.a (35%) 
Luxembourg 10% (<5%) n.k (n.k) n.a (n.a) n.a (n.a) 
Netherlands  30% (30%) n.k (n.k) 35% (2%) n.k (n.k) 
Portugal 9% (n.k) 7% (n.k) 1% (n.k) 1% (n.k) 
Spain  18% (>50%) 5% (22%) 0% (5%) 0% (5%) 
Sweden 50% (n.k) 5% (n.k) n.k (n.a) 10% (n.a) 
UK 50% (>50%) n.k (19%) 50% (47%) 22% (13%) 
Source: EU Commission (2005b: 5, 6) 
n.a.: Not applicable 
n.k. = No information 
 
 
